

## *Emile* as operative category of Rousseau's thought

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**Resumo:** O presente ensaio pretende desenvolver a perspectiva de que, para Rousseau, o *Emílio* era fundamentalmente um relato lógico que possibilitasse a compreensão da infância, de seu desenvolvimento e da natureza humana. Como sabemos, o estado de natureza é, na tradição contratualista, uma exigência lógica; assim como Emílio ao nascer. O estado civil é a consequência deduzida do pressuposto de uma natureza previamente concebida. Assim como o pacto é o princípio regulador de que Rousseau se vale para desvendar o estado de natureza, a educação do Emílio, ao formar o homem civil, tem intenção de revelar os atributos do homem de natureza. Rousseau inventa seu tempo social, de acordo com uma hipótese que lhe era anterior. Rousseau também inventa o Emílio; e não pretende confundir-lo com a criança histórica. O Emílio é antes, um relato, uma metáfora, uma suposição ou categoria operatória, que, enquanto tal, remeteria o leitor à compreensão dos atributos imanentes da condição humana. Há paralelismo, portanto, entre o homem de natureza e as primeiras idades da vida. Até onde se pôde constatar, a pedagogia, usualmente, não tem reconhecido esse caráter operatório e instrumental do Emílio como construção analítica. Em síntese, poderíamos dizer que Rousseau, ao criar outra temporalidade para ancorar sua teoria social, estruturou também um tempo alternativo para refletir sobre a trajetória dessa sua criação imaginária: *Emílio*. Assim como o pacto social, Emílio não é histórico; é, sobretudo, um princípio regulador necessário à análise.

**Palavras Chave:** Rousseau. *Emílio*. *Emílio* como categoria operatória.

**Abstract:** This essay aims at developing the perspective that, for Rousseau, *Emile* was basically a logical account that allows the comprehension of infancy, its development, and human nature. As we know, the state of nature is a logical requirement in the social contract tradition as well as Emílio when birth. Civil state is the consequence deduced from the tenet of a previously conceived nature. As pact is the ruling principle that Rousseau uses to uncover the state of nature, Emile's education when forming civil man intends to reveal the attributes of man of nature. Rousseau invents his social time according to a hypothesis that existed before him. Rousseau also invents Emile, and that one did not want to confuse Emile with the child as a historical subject. Emile is a story, a metaphor, a surmise or operative category that would send readers to the understanding of immanent attributes of human condition. Therefore, there are parallels between nature man and the earliest ages of life. As far as one could see, pedagogy does usually not have recognized Emile's operative and instrumental character as analytical construction. In synthesis, we could say when Rousseau has created another temporality to anchor his social theory; he has also structured an alternative time to reflect on the trajectory of his imaginary creation: *Emile*. Just as the social pact, Emile is not historical but he is primarily a regulatory principle necessary to analysis.

**Keywords:** Rousseau. *Emile*. *Emile* as operative category.

### 1. Introduction

Reflecting on Rousseau's political and educational thought invites us to meditate on temporality created by the author to give rise to their peculiar meanings of culture, civilization, kindness, nature, virtue, society, and reason, mainly of civilization. History that Rousseau builds is another. Hence, the moment of history and social place to be played by it are also different. Rousseau intends, in his writings, to recover the lost origin, gets to the first point where the very notion of time would

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have been invented. However, this beginning retaken would require an assumption of possibilities: a different story – no masks – to explain the human race and to tell the individual life development in two basic analytical aspects: in the first case, it was about policy; in the second, pedagogy.

As we know, differing to some degree of his contemporary fellows, Rousseau wage a battle with Enlightenment between love and war. Zealous of defense of perfectibility as an intrinsic attribute of Mankind, since the beginning, Rousseau establishes himself as critics to progress. The journey of the species, at some point, disfigured the man of nature, and he would never return to. Therefore, it was about to radicalize the field of culture and sign another essentially better pact of civilization. However, Rousseau shared with his Enlightenment contemporaries an aprioristic vision of history deprived of empirical concern. In Rousseau, History becomes a logical and consequently necessary story. The political theorists have long recognized this. This essay intent to demonstrate that, in education, Rousseau does the same. The state of nature was a logical requirement as well as Emile when birth. Civil state is the consequence deduced from the tenet of a previously conceived nature. Because pact is the ruling principle that Rousseau uses to uncover the state of nature, Emile's education when forming the civil man intends to reveal the attributes of the man of nature. Rousseau invents his social time along with a hypothesis that existed before him. Rousseau also invents Emile, and that one did not want to confuse Emile with the historical child. Emile is a story, a metaphor, a surmise or operative category that would refer to original human attributes of human condition, and as Rousseau more clearly expressed in the first ages of life. As far as one could see, pedagogy does usually not have recognized Emile's operative and instrumental character as analytical construction. In synthesis, we could say when Rousseau has created another temporality to anchor his social theory he has also structured an alternative time to reflect on the trajectory of his imaginary creation: Emile. Just as the social pact, Emile is not historical but he is primarily a regulatory principle necessary to analysis.

Therefore, we can say that the idea of history in Rousseau's thought is deliberately ahistorical. The trajectory of civilization is presented as a choice by conjecture that would ultimately have the merit of teleologically designing a better future even at the risk of breaching some preconceived temporality. Logically speaking, thought by conjecture assumes deduced consequences. Thus, paradoxically, the same author, who intends to reject the rhumb taken by human reason in its historical development, valleys of it to the limit, even rejecting it, drawing conceptual matrix deductively browsed inch by inch, as if time was held hostage of architecture of human thought. About this subject matter, Rousseau (1976) defends himself, arguing that surmise may be an important way of truth knowledge due to those principles are plausible, and they can offer reasonable conclusions.

It is possible to verify Cartesian rationality mark in Rousseau's work (HAWTORN, 1982). By leaving aside the factual truth, supposing that it will not interfere in the question resolution, the entire foundation of Rousseau's thought up erect on a conditional and hypothetical pathway from which truths would be deduced since first intuitions, as it happens in Descartes. This characterization has been widely explored by analysis about Rousseau's political thought. However, it seems valid to reflect on teaching proposal of the same theorist by an analytical support similar to one that governs the interpretation of his political work. The reflection we propose in here would aim at establishing interfaces between politics and pedagogy in the context of Rousseau's work.

## 2. Rousseau, history and politics

It is known Rousseau's answer to the question that brought him notoriety in a contest launched by Academy of Dijon in 1749: "has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended to purify morals?" Since the beginning, the writer acknowledges the complexity challenge he was then darts. Faced with an era that extremely extolled science and techniques as a source of greater humanization, civilization, and social improvement, Rousseau takes as binomial the tense relation between development of science and practice of virtue. He does not direct his thinking to get any level of empirical fidelity. He would not build his trajectory about facts based on historical temporality. And yet, his narrative has claim to truth. It is about taking History to make an exaltation of memory: the value of historical truth falls into the value of example to be followed or the trajectory refusal concerning its merits. If the appearance is historic, the essence of *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* seems to be prescribed morality for a future to be scanned.

At the time, pedagogical orientation, which encompassed young and mature generations' hearts and minds, are mainly based on ornamentation of politeness, requirements of decorum, rules of courtesy, commandments of urbanity, tactics of civility as if there indeed was, a uniform pattern of good behavior for regulation of manner of appearing, seeming, and, finally, of being in said-good society. However, social action radically contradicts the exercise of that representation, so that whatever the kindness in social traits prevented to say would be expressed by actual clashes that took place behind the deceptive veil of this social commerce. In his well-known *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, Rousseau reveals the tricks of civilizatory language and perplexities along the intermittent path of species improvement of the. More than that, Rousseau reflects on possible obstacles in understanding facts. History was not necessarily faithful to the truth, since its own language between letters and arts would be questionable.

In 1753, Academy of Dijon launched another essay contest: "What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by the natural law?" Again intrigued by the theme, Rousseau feels invited to participate. In *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men*, Rousseau also creates and mobilizes an imaginary temporality to think the trajectory of man in society. He says although nothing can be known with exactness, it is plausible to conjecture and establish analytical parameters from a narrative built to provide organization of operative categories. For Rousseau, meditating on the state of nature and the emergence of civil life have demanded to take as a presupposition a certain common sense to governments' formation. Knowing the source, origin, reasons for inequality first of all supposed to identify basic features of human being, Rousseau thought it could be verified the paths by means of which nature has formed this man as well as changes that civilization has submitted the same man. As a consequence, the philosopher understands that circumstances in which the civilized man is have interfered in its natural state change (ROUSSEAU, 1976). Under a political perspective, it was necessary to try to find that primordial human being, which had been corrupted by civilizing process. Rousseau explicitly presents his story as an imaginary story, demonstrating it was difficult to differentiate what was originary and what was artifice in human constitution. To do so, as an operator resource, the *Second Discourse* proposes the imaginary reconstitution of a natural state, which probably had never existed but whose characterization became necessary to verify in human condition attributes that, in fact, would belong to it (ROUSSEAU, 1976). There would have as in *Second Discourse* social inequality opposed and later inequalities rooted in the state of nature. Built in this way, the text seeks to highlight the point of view of a particular temporality imagined or intuited, the moment that right succeeds to violence, or social

step that leads to submission to laws of nature. The author points out that this conjecture does not intend to root in a particular factual and empirical truth. Beyond this, Rousseau has revealed his clear intention in presenting hypothetical and conditional reasoning capable of engendering logically relevant deductions that also seemed plausible to understand the history of man in society (ROUSSEAU, 1976).

At birth, individual would never be originally bad. By ignoring the very meaning of evil, it would come into the world with its original goodness, analogous to human situation of the state of nature. At first, the natural man, unknowing the evil, has only a sense of self-preservation, which leads him to take care of him. Similarly, in its development, the child by ignoring the addiction will allow it being practiced. Note that, since his early writings, Rousseau establishes a recurrent and obsessive analogy between progression of human species and development of younger generations: as the ontogeny repeats phylogeny, and human being reproduces in its life history, the trajectory drawn by species.

The feeling of existence would have appeared in line with the feeling of conservation of species. The man of nature battles against hunger to perpetuate the species, to preserve body's strength and balance so that he overcomes the obstacles of nature. The very neighborly relations have created a first distribution for land cultivation and to project each person's individuality of working land. The common state of men had already changed affectivity with marital and paternal love, separating each family from the other family clans. However, in dispute with its fellows, and the victory of the strongest, that individual, already having a certain self-love, creates a sense of pride, this contributing for recognition desire: the distress of disparaging look, the vanity fearing the disdain, concern about a possible negative evaluation from fellows.

The civil man that gradually created himself would live outside himself as a hostage to the others' judgment and opinions. As becoming more complex, community life had caused an increasing of the men's dispute, especially by public esteem. Nature inequalities started to be highlighted in different proportions: beauty, strength, courage, vanity, and disdain, shame and envy. It sets the stage to all against all competition. To win, human being recourses to its spirit skills: it discovers, creates, invents, and transforms natural data into culture. In short, the duties of civilization have been created. With different talents and willingness to work also varied among men, the success of each one does not give more opportunity for everyone's enjoyment: individual interest will be diametrically placed opposed to the others' interests, competitors, rivals, and, then, already unequal.

Smashing them against each other, men create the first pact proposed by the owners primarily as a strategy of order protection. Regulations were established for collective life organization. Regulations in principle everyone should respect and obey, because by all means the law should protect community members against the ever-present risk of eternal discord, result of passions and human disagreements. The political institutionalization was given. The original agreement had been signed.

### **3. A logical report of historical factors**

Like *Emile*, *The Social Contract* was written in 1757, as we know, and both books were published in 1762. In *The Social Contract* that would consecrate Rousseau as one of the greatest modern policy theorists, it was about to seek out a civil solution for questions expressed in the narrative built, according to his own intention to investigate "the origin and the bases of inequality among mankind". If in his

*Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau had done a logical, deductive inventory of reasons that led to the loss of the state of nature, in *The Social Contract*, he tries to find evidences for possible future trails. So perhaps, it has been said that the social contract did not only address a social pact but especially the social affection (JOUVENEL, 1980), since an all individuals' collective mandate about the issue of power would necessarily tie ones to the others. The first proof is simple: hopelessly lost, the freedom of the state of nature, natural goodness, and mercy, which accompany it, would never be recovered. It was about ensure an instrument of civil life based on social criteria founded on the sign of virtue. For that, under Rousseau's point of view in *The Social Contract*, it is going to be necessary to build an alternative pact that is exclusively comprised aiming at men's self-preservation against the others different from the first one, therefore.

In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau clearly explains his purpose since the first lines that says he intends to investigate the possibility to have in the civil order an administration rule that allows comprising men as they are, and laws as they may be (ROUSSEAU, 1980). Thinking about society was under any point of view to think about its civil origin pact. For Rousseau, the first pact leads to men to leave the state of nature, and it occurred at illegitimate levels, although there always was an edge by which it could be possible to think and design a legitimate association, able to defend and protect people, so that each one in uniting to everyone obeys, ultimately, to itself – through the perception of being the own author of common law (ROUSSEAU, 1980). This was the regulatory maximum of drafting a new “social contract” whereby people put their own will under the command of the general will (ROUSSEAU, 1980). The idea of general will does not exactly correspond to the wishes of the majority people but it supposed a unified collective will directed to representing the good of all mankind, precisely because individual wills would be subtracted from its constitution defacing, in essence, the common interest. With the general will, the civil pact gets moral freedom, since, serving the needs of all, each one could be considered as its own master.

Recognizing the contractual hypothesis as a more logic than historic requirement, recognizing the idea of sovereignty and its implications for general will meaning would be operative artifacts of legal universe, not confusing with any specific genealogy, it would be appropriate to ask: who is Emilio? Roque Spencer Maciel de Barros says that Rousseau's purpose – in conceiving Emile – was to design the sage's formation, understanding morality and self-domain in that. Emile was the man ready to experience the corrupted society or liberty of the Social Contract. Emile is wise to “to listening to the voice of one's conscience in the silence of the passions”. This wise, who resembles the ideal of the ancient moralists, is the authentic man, a citizen of the world in illegitimate societies (BARROS, 1963). Somehow, this wise man could even be the legislature of *The Social Contract* since he should be, as described by Rousseau, conspicuous, extraordinary just to be able to act as spokesperson for the collective yearnings. On the other hand, the freedom characterized as an inner disposition to well-behaving, to postulate an autonomous will, liable for straight choice, this same freedom would refer to virtue, and thus to a “must-be” when viewed in the public sphere of civil society. Therefore, Emile's education unlike that a purely educational nature interpretation postulated does not intended to be presented as a model of education, perhaps even as an example. It did not desire to produce parameters or references as well educating. It did not suppose to be neither an education *in* freedom. It would be more likely to educate *of* freedom, or *to* liberty in its anthropological dimension. Note that, in Rousseauian thought, freedom of civil state required a rather complex process of self-knowledge, and ethical and moral developing of ability to choose – the civil man's insight – would not have

started in this sense. Neither the fact that Rousseau approximates boy of nature, nor the very concept of negative education, the criticism made to the parameters of education that prevailed at that time, or even the distance of people's world and book world, none allows us inferring freedom in Emile's education. However, freedom perceived in civil state as a result of the ability of ethical consideration, judgment, and choice between just and unjust, children as well men of the state of nature do not possess and first and on principle, that will freedom.

#### 4. Emile as a standard concept

Rousseau formulates another hypothetical temporality he believed he could infer valid implications for social life. This idea of normativity external to historical time seems to be consensual to think about Rousseau's political work. Indeed, the author confirms it in several passages of his writings. However, it seems to us plausible to think the education project in *Emile* under the same reference, that is: the boy Emile does not exist; did not exist, and he was not thought to exist. It is about a logical, deductive artifact to meditate on education and on teaching advising. Rousseau builds the temporality of Emile's life as a fiction. It never would have proposed to apply it. In consequence, the whole work's normative meaning should be pondered by reason considerations as if it was about a metaphor. *Emile* is neither history of the past, nor future project. *Emile* is an allegory for reflection on the act of educating children. It has not history but due to working with virtue, it has some commitment to truth: truth of the essence, universal truth, truth contained in the meaning of the first condition of humanity.

Emile is neither son, nor a student. He is a theoretical construct and an operative support for conceptual analysis of education act. Early in *Emile*, Rousseau explains the difference between the task on which his teacher deals and teacher's everyday function. The last one looks at the student as if he sees a burden in front of him, while the student considers the teacher as the source of its plagues; both ones wanting to free from one another (ROUSSEAU, 1979). It would be quite different if teacher and student had the task of passing 25 years of their lives together. Hence, the fact that guardian be advised by the text to demonstrate its weaknesses for the student. Aiming at keeping authority, Rousseauian pedagogical treatise recommends to the teacher it attempts to touch its disciple's human heart, and this will only happen as teacher gets stronger in the relation of master-disciple, an willingness to put in place of educating (ROUSSEAU, 1979).

If a disciple does not part company with master since the birth to maturity, it can suppose that in such comment, *Emile's* "creator" wanted the narrative of the individual's life trajectory matched to a reconstitution of the steps tracked by mankind towards civilization. At birth, Emile is the man of state of nature. Emile well educated who, with 25 years old, says goodbye to his teacher is the civil man who lives in a corrupt society but, despite this, he can be considered able to establish a legitimate social contract. Under this temporality, Rousseau honors his commitment to historic he designs to describe the process of civilization. For social analysis, if he shy away from commitment to factual truth, it can be deduced that, when designing his Emile as an "ideal-type" of human development, Rousseau also assumes free to not limit himself to historical child. I think it's possible to understand Emile just as an operative category explicitly inscribed in a method that, like in *Discourses* and *The Social Contract*, intended to be purely hypothetical-deductive, in order to prove human being's life history correspond to the social trajectory operated by gender in its course of civilization.

The reason would be the last ability that nature would develop, hence the refusal of Emile's teacher in initiating the route of education through rational instrument. This would be a composition of numerous abilities to be worked previously, even because – as Rousseau (1979) ensures – nature wants children are children before being men.

In some passages, *Emile's* author assumes his intention to form civil man through the rational development of social virtues, which could only be accomplished in light of attributes found in the man of nature. Emile needs to be modeled with the aim at becoming rational to integrate a rationality civilization. However, tied to values that were inculcated in his heart by the same process that guides the maturation of his rational ability, Emile are going to be able to distinguish right from wrong. He does not get to be carried away neither by his more immediate passions, nor by the others' opinions. Governed by the own reason, Emile (ROUSSEAU, 1979) would see the world through his own eyes, and he would judge things by his own heart. Note that, for Rousseau, the primordial goal of education was to form a human morality; and moral human being is one who chooses the good of its own accord.

The first human feeling – which originates all others as presupposed – was the self-love in both, child and man in the state of nature. In both, this self-love – considered an intrinsic feeling to the man (since it would be present in primordial conditions) (ROUSSEAU, 1979) – would derive from the ability to love everyone to move towards us incurring in compassion and self-esteem. As it has already seen, pity would be characterized as a principle of justice intrinsic to any human being, according to whom the ability to judge as good or bad our actions and those of others is developed. The consciousness arising there would be a special kind of sensitivity by which judgments are socially generated to the other. A certain feeling of compassion for the others' misfortunes – basically in the mental attitude of putting oneself in another's place, recognizing itself in another's suffering – generates the social awareness through the exercise of compassion. It is the love for ourselves that leads us to identify with others. Nevertheless this same characteristic will lead us to the desire for recognition, the claim of distinction, to be matched in our preferences, finally, to be more than the others.

Therefore, instructing Emile to society would demand to learn to live by it and learn to live with others and for others. In this sense, Emile's formation led to the knowledge of men as well the tools of conviviality (ROUSSEAU, 1979).

Rousseau characterizes the man by free will and by reason. Consequently, the human would be a principle of choice that would provide to humanity the possibility to form well an opinion. In this sense, the same bedrock that gives support to will is going to draw attention to judgment. At this rate, as pondering, judging, reasoning, and acting toward choices that lead to the good, it would be necessary maturity. Only this would bring needed discernment to develop the virtue, which could be considered the synthesis between rational judgment and autonomous will in civil man and individual development. Nature would have created the human race to lead it to freedom: in the natural state and in early childhood, nature shows signs of its vocation to the Free State; however, society holds it. Only the civil man of legitimate contract or the individual sufficiently educated and mature to establish this new contract recover the original freedom, now necessarily coupled with a tendency for the good, the beautiful and fair. *Emile* says about this topic – in Rousseau's (1979) words – freedom is a constituent attribute of free human heart before being a condition of this or that form of government.

In any hypothesis, Emile's education tracing proposed to educator as a metaphor for reflection, a meditation on the art of forming men. Using the same

hypothetical-deductive structure that guided his political writings, Rousseau constructs his student, a disciple who is not and never intended to be empirical but who has its own temporality inscribed in the narrative of his first 25 years old in education.

Although there is often an entailing between Rousseau's political thought and his appropriation by nineteenth-century theorists of democracy, or especially his appropriation by the great revolutionary movement that had anchored in his reference – the French Revolution –, we could not confuse the rigorous analysis of political science on Rousseau's ideas with Jacobin matrix that intended to use them. We recognize the need for intellectual considerations, essential to consider the idea of history that guided the author's reflection of *The Social Contract*.

## 5. Final considerations

In educational theory field, the analysis would require the identification of other variables known to be the greatest of modern pedagogical treatise; *Emile* is often considered the founding father of the modern sensibility of childhood that had been built since the beginning of modern times. However, this finding has sometimes led theorists of pedagogy to hasty conclusions about the interpretation of procedures recommended by Rousseau to educate the child of civilization. Thus, although *Emile* represents the conceptual, operative artifact to explain different situations, the tradition of the history of educational ideas tends to take the maxims developed by Rousseau's *Emile* as concrete requirements for the apprehension of alleged laws of juvenile development, hence inferring stagist conclusions about supposed evolutionary steps of human development, in terms of physical, cognitive, emotional, and moral. To some extent, the tradition of education renewed – the ongoing movement in Europe and the United States since the late nineteenth century – is tributary to that way of thinking of liberty applied in educating children, taking as reference the public recognition of Rousseau's classic discourse. It wonders if Rousseau would approve such literal – literally – appropriations of his educative essay.

Starobinski points out that the first obstacle to understanding Rousseau's thought is exactly in a very important category rather to the philosopher, and that by no means ceased to be one of the main quirk of his theoretical formulation: transparency. Starobinski (1971) warns the absolute transparency is the state whereby one sees nothing, neither shadows. Consequently, doing an apology for a radical transparency in his conceptual categories, Rousseau creates some absolute despite not enough visible. On the other hand, the fertility of Rousseau's thought would lie exactly on the opacity he deemed transparent, through the idea of the invisible pact it can be viewed relevant information to social life through the fictional creation of *Emile* (also invisible boy because he is ahistorical as well), it is possible to see contemporary features of children that surround us, actually, in our time, all around us. That's why the relevance of Rousseau's narrative, which invariably invites us to think about man, about virtue, about truth and history.

In structuring his concept of “ideal type”, Max Weber says the generalization is practically a requirement of communication, even in a speech everyone understands. More than that, the search for regularities would be a basic requirement of the human sciences research. Therefore, thinking about history and truth would mean to speak a common language, which categorizes us as interlocutors of a collection of accumulated thought, which also operates on conventions and on the necessary construction of wide value categories. In this sense, establishing these categories is a condition to make intelligible the thought, which in turn circulates in a community



mediated by common codes. In this fashion, Weber points up that, when reporting the real, it is worth to affirm or reaffirm concepts of value, whose meaning, having common bedrock shared by a certain community of interpreters, got new configurations in light of historical realities that are different in each specifically described situation.

Assuming an intrinsic correlation between history, truth, and these “ideas of value” represents for Weberian thought intellectual procedure necessary to circumscribe the reality on which we intend to work. More than that, it would be a prerequisite for obtaining regularities, and an appeal to objectivity in human sciences (WEBER, 1979). It is the intermingling of ideas in imagination that through the concepts will effectively allow going beyond them. Therefore, the conceptual precision arises as a logical consequence of thinking in which, like it or not, the concept foregoes the interpretation of fact. By definition, although conceptual parameters of the analysis – or Weberian ideal types – are not historical, they should be, no doubt, extremely strict, even for they may be liable for using in empirical research of any reality. The ideal type is under Weber’s point of view the primary resource for understanding the relation of historical individuals with their environment and their temporality. Hence, the need for these types has a different relation with time, with the ultimate purpose of seizing historically given individuals.

Rousseau was a remarkable thinker of ideal types. Not only ideas related to the state of nature and the civil state (that already widely circulated at the eighteenth century), but chiefly categories such as general will, sovereignty, mercy, kindness, natural goodness, self-love, self-esteem, virtue, sensitive reason, propriety, civilization, science, freedom and equality would win original meanings to think about the very modern sense of democracy and education for democracy. It is no accident that pondering about Rousseau is always classical and contemporary task saying something to our contemporaneity as it was to his time.

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